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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
On December 4, 2008, the Utah Department of Health (the "Department") issued 
an order denying petitioners Orchard Park Care Center, Rock Canyon Rehab and 
Nursing, and Trinity Mission Health ("Petitioners") leave to intervene in respondent 
Stonehenge of Orem, LLC's ("Licensee") efforts to obtain a license for a 36-bed skilled 
nursing facility in Utah County. (R. 470-71.) 
As discussed in detail below, this Court does not have jurisdiction under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a) because the Department's Final Agency Order denying 
intervention and ordering that "the licensing of Pointe Meadows should occur without 
fiirther delay and without the need for a hearing" (R. 480) was not a final order or decree 
"resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings." Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a). 
Prior to the issuance of Licensee's license, there was no pending formal adjudicative 
proceeding in which to intervene. Instead, under the Department's rules, the decision to 
grant or deny a license is an "initial agency determination," defined as "a decision by 
department staff, without conducting adjudicative proceedings . . . ." Utah Admin. Code 
R432-30-2(2) (emphasis added). 
The Department's regulations provide that any "person affected by an initial 
agency determination may commence an adjudicative proceeding . . . by completing the 
'Facility Licensing Request for Agency Action' form and filing the form with the 
Department." Utah Admin. Code R432-30-3(3). Petitioners did not request agency 
action is this matter either during the licensing process or after Licensee had obtained its 
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license. Accordingly, Petitioners have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and 
this Court does not have jurisdiction over Petitioners' Petition for Review. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 63G-4-401(2) ("A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all 
administrative remedies available "); Bluth v. Utah State Tax Comm % 2002 UT 91, 
}^ 23 (reversing and remanding with instructions that cased be dismissed for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff had failed to exhaust administrative 
remedies). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue No. 1; Whether Petitioner exhausted its administrative remedies by filing a 
Petition to Intervene with the Department rather than commencing an adjudicative 
proceeding by filing a request for agency action as required by Utah Admin. Code 
R432-30-3. 
Standard of Review: Whether a party has exhausted its administrative remedies 
is reviewed for correctness. Whaley v. Park City Mum Corp., 2008 UT App 234, \ 9. 
Issue No, 2: Whether the Department appropriately denied Petitioners' Petition to 
Intervene in Licensee's efforts to obtain a health care facility license. 
Standard of Review: Whether the licensing proceedings constituted a formal 
adjudicative proceeding in which intervention is permissible is a legal question reviewed 
for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). The Department's 
decision that intervention was inappropriate because of considerations regarding the 
interests of justice and the orderly and prompt conduct of the adjudicative proceedings 
(see Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-207(2)(b)) is reviewed for "substantial evidence" in the 
2 
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record. In re Questar Gas Co., 2007 UT 79, ^f 30, 33 (affirming order denying 
intervention because "the request to intervene will materially impair the interests of 
justice and the orderly and prompt conduct of the Commission proceedings"). 
Issue No, 3: Whether the Department was required to reach the merits of the 
statutory claims raised by Petitioners in their unsuccessful Petition to Intervene in 
Licensee's licensing proceeding. 
Standard of Review: Whether an agency "decided all of the issues requiring 
resolution," Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(c), is reviewed under a correction of error 
standard. See EAGALA, Inc. v. Department of Workforce Services, 2007 UT App 43, ^ | 7. 
Issue No. 4: Whether the Department acted within its discretion in granting 
Licensee a license to operate a Medicare-only facility based, in part, on Licensee's filing 
of a "Notice of Intent" with the Department before the March 1, 2007 Legislative 
deadline established by Utah Code Ann. § 26-21-23(4). 
Standard of Review: With respect to an agency's "interpretation of the operative 
provisions of the statutory law it is empowered to administer, [agency] findings must be 
rationally based and are set aside only if they are imposed arbitrarily and capriciously or 
are beyond the tolerable limits of reason." Associated General Contractors v. Board of 
Oil, Gas & Mining, 2001 UT 112, f 18 (emphasis added); see also Concerned Parents v. 
Mitchell, 645 P.2d 629, 633 (Utah 1982) ("Judicial deference is usually accorded an 
agency's interpretation of a statute which that agency is charged with enforcing."). 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-21-23, the same section in which the Legislative deadline 
appears, states that "[t]he department may make rules to administer and enforce this part 
3 
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in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act." Utah 
Code Ann. § 26-21-23(4). Utah Code Ann. § 26-l-30(2)(b) further provides that the 
Department is to "establish, maintain, and enforce rules necessary or desirable to carry 
out the provisions and purposes of this title to promote and protect the public health or to 
prevent disease and illness " As a result, the Department's interpretation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 26-21-23 must be affirmed unless it is shown to be irrational, arbitrary, 
capricious or beyond the tolerable limits of reason. Assoc. Gen. Contractors, 2001 UT 
112,1118. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann, § 26-1-30 
(2) In addition to all other powers and duties of the department, it shall have and 
exercise the following powers and duties: 
(b) establish, maintain, and enforce rules necessary or desirable to carry out the 
provisions and purposes of this title to promote and protect the public health or to prevent 
disease and illness . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. S 26-21-9(1) 
(1) An application for license shall be made to the department in a form 
prescribed by the department. The application and other documentation requested by the 
department as part of the application process shall require such information as the 
committee determines necessary to ensure compliance with established rules. 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-21-23(2), (4) and (5) 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (5), a new nursing care facility shall be 
approved for a health facility license only if the applicant proves to the division that: 
(a) the facility will be Medicaid certified under the provisions of Section 6-
18-503; 
(b) the facility will have at least 120 beds; or 
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(c) (i) the facility's projected Medicare inpatient revenues do not exceed 
49% of the facility's revenues; 
(ii) the facility has identified projected non-Medicare inpatient 
revenue sources; and 
(iii) the non-Medicare inpatient revenue sources identified in this 
Subsection (2)(c)(iii) will constitute at least 51% of the revenues as demonstrated through 
an independently certified feasibility study submitted and paid for by the facility and 
provided to the division. 
(4) The department may make rules to administer and enforce this part in 
accordance with Title 63 G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(5) The provisions of Subsection (2) do not apply to a nursing care facility that 
has: 
(a) filed an application with the department and paid all applicable fees to 
the department on or before February 28, 2007; and 
(b) submitted to the department the working drawings, as defined by the 
department by administrative rule, on or before July 1, 2008. 
Utah Code Ann, § 63G-4-207(2) 
(2) The presiding officer shall grant a petition for intervention if the presiding 
officer determines that: 
(a) the petitioner's legal interests may be substantially affected by the 
formal adjudicative proceeding; and 
(b) the interests of justice and the orderly and prompt conduct of the 
adjudicative proceedings will not be materially impaired by allowing the intervention. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-401(2)(a) 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative 
remedies available, except that: 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative remedies 
if this chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not required . . . . 
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Utah Code Ann, § 78A-4-103(2)(a) 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State 
Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of 
Forestry, Fire, and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the 
Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer 
Utah Admin. Code R432-2-6(l), (2), (8) and (9) 
(1) An applicant for a license shall file a Request for Agency Action/License 
Application with the Utah Department of Health on a form furnished by the Department. 
(2) Each applicant shall comply with all zoning, fire, safety, sanitation, building 
and licensing laws, regulations, ordinances, and codes of the city and county in which the 
facility or agency is located. The applicant shall obtain the following clearances and 
submit them as part of the completed application to the licensing agency: 
(a) A certificate of fire clearance from the State Fire Marshal or designated 
local fire authority certifying compliance with local and state fire codes is required with 
initial and renewal application, change of ownership, and at any time new construction or 
substantial remodeling has occurred. 
(b) A satisfactory Food Services Sanitation Clearance report by a local or 
state sanitarian is required for facilities providing food service at initial application and 
upon a change of ownership. 
(c) Certificate of Occupancy from the local building official at initial 
application, change of location and at the time of any new construction or substantial 
remodeling. 
(8) The requirements contained in Utah Code Section 26-21-23(5)(a) shall be met 
if a nursing care facility filed a notice of intent or application with the Department and 
paid a fee relating to a proposed nursing care facility prior to March 1, 2007. 
(9) The requirements contained in Utah Code Section 26-21-23(5)(b) shall be met 
if a nursing care facility complies with the requirements of R432-4-14(4) and R432-4-16 
on or before July 1, 2008. 
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Utah Admin, Code R432-30-2 
(1) "Department" means the Utah Department of Health, Bureau of Licensing. 
(2) "Initial agency determination" means a decision by department staff, without 
conducting adjudicative proceedings, of the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or 
other legal interests of one or more identifiable persons, including all determinations to 
grant, deny, revoke, suspend, modify, annul, withdraw, or amend an authority, right, or 
license, all as limited by Subsection 63-46b-l(2). 
(3) "Notice of agency action" means the formal notice meeting the requirements of 
Subsection 63-46b-(3)2 that the department issues to commence an adjudicative 
proceeding. 
(4) "Request for agency action" means the formal written request meeting the 
requirements of Subsection 63-46b-3(3) that requests the department to commence an 
adjudicative proceeding. 
Utah Admin. Code R432-30-3 
(1) All adjudicative proceedings under Title 26, Chapter 21, Health Care Facility 
Licensure and Inspection Act, and under R432, Health Facility Licensing Rules, are 
formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(2) The Department may commence an adjudicative proceeding by filing and 
serving a notice of agency action in accordance with Subsection 63-46b-3(2) when the 
Department's actions are of a nature that require an adjudicative proceeding before the 
Department makes a decision. 
(3) A person affected by an initial agency determination may commence an 
adjudicative proceeding and meet the requirements of a request for agency action under 
Subsection 63-46b-3(3) by completing the "Facility Licensing Request for Agency 
Action" form and filing the form with the department. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND 
DISPOSITION BELOW. 
This case arises from the Department's issuance of a license to Licensee to operate 
a 36-bed skilled nursing facility in Utah County. Licensee obtained its license on 
December 18, 2008, after working closely with the Department through the application 
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process for more than a year-and-a-half. At the time Licensee opposed Petitioners 
unsuccessful Motion for Stay filed with this Court, Licensee employed approximately 31 
full and part-time employees at the facility {See Affidavit of Cory Robison in Opposition 
to Motion for Stay filed in this Court on January 26, 2009 ("Robison Affidavit"), H 21.) 
This number has now grown to approximately 80. The total cost of constructing the 
facility, which was subject to periodic inspections by the Department as part of the 
application process, was approximately $6.4 million. {Id., f 19.) 
Petitioners petitioned to intervene in the licensing process on March 25, 2008. (R. 
153-159.) The Department denied Petitioners leave to intervene by letter dated June 5, 
2008. (R. 392-93.) Petitioners filed a Request for Reconsideration with the Department 
on June 24, 2008 (R. 401-10), and the Department referred the issue to an independent 
hearing officer, Administrative Law Judge Margaret J. Clark. (R. 416.) 
Following additional briefing on the issue of intervention, including briefing by 
the Attorney General's office (R. 435-68), the Department issued a Final Agency Order 
adopting Judge Clark's Recommended Decision to Affirm Denial of Intervention on 
December 4, 2008. (R. 470-81.) 
Petitioners filed a Petition for Review with this Court and a Petition for stay of the 
Department's order with the Department on December 15, 2008. (R. 486-97.) The 
Department denied Petitioners' Petition for Stay and issued Licensee a Provisional 
License on December 18, 2008. {See Robison Aff, Ex. C; see also Addendum B to 
Petitioners' Brief.) Petitioners subsequently moved this Court for a stay of the 
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Department's December 15,2008 Order, which this Court denied in an Order dated 
February 23, 2009. 
II. FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. 
A. A Notice of Intent for the Facility Was Filed on February 28, 2007. 
1. In early-2006, Gary L. Burraston of Deseret Senior Services Consulting 
began working with Cory Robison and others (the "Partners") on the development of a 
small, skilled, Medicare-only nursing facility in Richfield, Utah. (R. 348, f 2.) 
%. In mid-2006, the Partners hired Mr. Burraston to assist them with the 
development of a similar nursing facility in Utah County. (R. 348, ^  3.) 
3. Mr. Burraston completed a feasibility study for the Utah County project in 
July 2006. (R. 3484 4.) 
4. After completing the Feasibility Study, Mr. Burraston contacted Joel 
Hoffman, a staff member at the Department, to inform the Department that the Partners 
intended to apply for a license for a skilled nursing facility in Utah County. (R. 348, If 6.) 
5. Mr. Hoffinan told Mr. Burraston that the Partners should not purchase land, 
submit a Notice of Intent or submit a License Application at that time because the 
Legislature would be a considering a moratorium on skilled nursing facilities during its 
2007 term that could be retroactive to August 2006. (R. 348, ^  7.) 
6. In January 2007, Marsha Bently, another staff member at the Department, 
told Mr. Burraston that the moratorium was expected to take effect on March 31, 2007. 
(R. 348, H 8.) 
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7. After learning that the moratorium was expected to take effect on March 
31, 2007, the Partners purchased land in Lehi for such a facility through a limited liability 
company in late-January 2007. (R. 370, f 4.) 
8. Consistent with what the Department had told him, on February 28, 2007, 
Mr. Burraston submitted a Notice of Intent to the Department for Medicare Certification 
and State Licensing of a 36-bed, Medicare-only facility called "Pointe Meadows" to be 
constructed in Lehi, Utah County. (R. 348, f 9; R. 357-58.) 
9. In the meantime, the Utah Legislature enacted a moratorium on new 
licenses for skilled, Medicare-only nursing facilities, unless such facilities had "(a) filed 
an application with the department and paid all applicable fees to the department on or 
before February 28, 2007; and (b) submitted to the department the working drawings, as 
defined by the department by administrative rule, on or before July 1, 2008." Utah Code 
Ann. § 26-21-23(5)(a) and (b). 
10. At the time he submitted the Notice of Intent, Mr. Burraston believed that 
the moratorium would take effect on March 31, 2007, because that is what Ms. Bently 
had told him. It was only when Mr. Burraston met with Ms. Bently a week later to 
submit two additional Notices of Intent that he learned the moratorium had taken effect at 
12:00 a.m. on March 1, 2007, and that the Department was no longer accepting Notices 
of Intent or License Applications for Medicare-only, skilled nursing facilities. (R. 349, 
1110.) 
11. On March 29, 2007, Mr. Burraston submitted a Request for Agency 
Action/License Application for the Pointe Meadows facility. (R. 349, If 11.) 
10 
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12. Effective May 29, 2007, Utah Admin. Code R432-2-6 was amended to state 
that "[t]he requirements contained in Utah Code Section 26-21-23(5)(a) shall be met if a 
nursing care facility filed a notice of intent or application with the Department and paid a 
fee relating to a proposed nursing care facility prior to March 1, 2007." Utah Admin. 
Code R432-2-6(8). 
B* The Partners Begin Construction of a Lehi Facility. 
13. In May 2007, the Partners obtained approval for the construction of a 
skilled nursing facility from the Lehi City Planning Commission. (R. 198, U 3.6.) At the 
meeting, the Partners were told that any proposed freeway near the location was "7-25 
years out." (Id) 
14. The Partners made a substantial investment in the Lehi location, paying for 
building and engineering plans, and construction including excavation, footing forms and 
the foundation. (R. 370, If 5.) 
C. The Partners Sell The Lehi Land To UDOT Under Threat Of Eminent 
Domain Proceedings. 
15. After making this initial investment, the Utah Department of Transportation 
("UDOT") approached Mr. Robison, told him that it intended to construct a freeway that 
would impact the Lehi property, and threatened eminent domain because it did not want 
to relocate a skilled nursing facility. (R. 370, ^ 6.) 
16. In light of the threat that UDOT would take the land through eminent 
domain proceedings, the Partners stopped construction immediately and chose to sell the 
Lehi land to UDOT. (R. 370,1(7.) 
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17. UDOT confirmed in a letter that if the Lehi property had not been sold 
voluntarily, it would have taken the land through eminent domain proceedings. (R. 370, 
H 8; R. 374.) 
18. The Department has indicated that it also received information from UDOT 
confirming that UDOT intended to take the Lehi property through eminent domain 
proceedings if the land was not sold to it voluntarily. (R. 349-50, ^ 15; R. 361.) 
D. The Department Approves Transfer Of The Pointe Meadows Facility 
To Orem. 
19. After selling the Lehi property to UDOT, the Partners retained 
CommerceCRG to search for suitable real estate in Utah County to relocate the skilled 
nursing facility that the Partners had planned for Lehi. CommerceCRG identified a 
potential location in Orem. (R. 349, |^ 12.) 
20. Before the Orem property was purchased, Mr. Burraston contacted Allan D. 
Elkins, the Director of the Department's Bureau of Health Facility Licensing, 
Certification, and Resident Assessment, to request that the project be transferred from the 
Lehi location to the Orem location under the existing Notice of Intent and License 
Application. (R. 349, % 13.) 
21. After some time had passed, Mr. Elkins called Mr. Burraston and approved 
the transfer to the Orem location. Mr. Elkins requested that Mr. Burraston formalize this 
request in an e-mail, which Mr. Burraston did on November 5, 2007. (R. 349, |^ 14; R. 
361.) 
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In his November 6, 2007 e-mail to Mr. Burraston, Mr. Elkins stated that: 
I have reviewed the information that you and UDOT have given me, and 
discussed it with our lead Assistant Attorney General. We agree that you 
may transfer your application from the Lehi location to the Orem location. 
Due to the unusual circumstances of your case, this decision is not to be 
taken as precedent. 
(R. 349-50,^115; R. 361.) 
22. This written approval from the Department was also required by the bank 
before it would approve financing for the purchase of the Orem land and the construction 
of the facility there. (R. 350, f 16.) 
23. After receiving this e-mail from Mr. Elkins, Licensee purchased land 
located at Center Street in Orem. (R. 350, H 17.) 
E. Licensee Breaks Ground At The Orem Location In January 2008 With 
The Department's Approval. 
24. On January 5, 2008, Mr. Burraston spoke with Mr. Bonn of the 
Department's Bureau of Health Facility Licensing, and Mr. Bonn did not object to 
Licensee breaking ground at the Orem location. The Licensee broke ground at the Orem 
location later that day. Mr. Bonn later confirmed in an e-mail that the Licensee had not 
done anything wrong by breaking ground at that time. (R. 351, 
120.) 
25. Mr. Burraston and Mr. Robison attended the Department's New Provider 
Orientation meeting on March 21, 2007. At that meeting, Mr. Burraston received a 
checklist with all of the required documents that need to be submitted in order to obtain a 
license. (R. 351,1J24, R. 368.) 
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26. This checklist contains all of the papers that must be submitted, fees that 
must be paid and tasks that must be completed as part of the Department's application for 
a license. (R. 368.) 
F. Petitioners' File a Petition to Intervene in the Licensing Process. 
27. On or about March 25, 2008, Petitioners filed a Petition to Intervene in the 
licensing process and Comments to Licensee's published Feasibility Study. (R. 153-59.) 
28. On June 5, 2008, the Department denied the Petition to Intervene in a letter 
from Mr. Elkins. (R. 392-93.) 
29. Petitioners chose not to appeal the June 5, 2008 denial of their Petition to 
Intervene, and did not move the Department for a stay at that time. Instead, Petitioners 
filed a Request for Reconsideration of their Petition to Intervene on June 24, 2008. (R. 
401-10.) 
30. In response to Petitioners' Request for Reconsideration, on August 13, 
2008, Mr. Elkins referred the matter to an independent hearing officer. (R. 416.) 
31. As of mid-2008, construction had progressed to the point where the 
Department was able to conduct its "4-way" inspection of the project, and approximately 
half of the money budgeted for the project was already spent. (R. 503, ^  10.) 
32. Administrative Law Judge Margaret J, Clark held a prehearing conference 
on October 21, 2008. (R. 431.) 
33. Following additional briefing regarding intervention, in a Recommended 
Decision dated December 3, 2008, Judge Clark denied the Request for Reconsideration of 
the Petition to Intervene, stating among other things that: 
14 
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Interested Parties are not entitled to intervene in the licensing of Pointe 
Meadows nursing facility because of the very unusual facts of this case, 
including: the need for eminent domain, the small number (36) of Medicare 
beds at stake and a mere 12-mile difference in the initially proposed and 
final location of the facility [A]t this late date, an administrative 
hearing that does not directly address the potential licensee, but an 
intervenor is unnecessary, contrary to the Bureau's precedent, and not in the 
best interest of the public or the Medicaid program. 
(R. 475.) 
34. Judge Clark's Recommended Decision was adopted in its entirety by Dr. 
Marc Babitz, Director of the Division of Health Systems Improvement, Utah Department 
of Health, in a Final Agency Order dated December 4, 2008. (R. 470-81.) 
35. Eleven days later, on December 15, 2008, Petitioners filed a Petition for 
Stay of the December 4, 2008 Order with the Department. (R. 486-494.) 
36. On December 15, 2008, after passing the Department's final inspection, the 
Department verbally informed Licensee that it would receive its Provisional License 
shortly. (R. 522, ^ 12.) 
37. On December 17, 2008, Timothy J. McClure, a construction inspector for 
the Department, recommended approval of a license for the facility. (R. 522, f 13.) 
38. On December 18, 2008, the Department granted Licensee its license, 
permitting it to accept residents. {See Robison Aff, Ex. C; see also Addendum B to 
Petitioners' Brief.) 
39. Licensee accepted its first resident at the facility on December 19, 2008. 
(Robinson Aff, Tf 16.) 
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40. Following issuance of the Provisional License on December 18, 2008, the 
Department issued Licensee a Standard License. Licensee received a copy of its 
Standard License, dated January 12, 2009, on January 22, 2009. (Id, 1f 17 and Ex. D 
thereto.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Rather than filing a Request for Agency Action with the Department to commence 
formal adjudicative proceedings under Utah Admin. Code R432-30-3(3) to challenge the 
Department's handling of Licensee's application or the issuance of a license to Licensee, 
Petitioners instead only sought to intervene in the licensing proceedings. However, the 
Department's decision to grant a license is not the product of a formal adjudicative 
proceeding in which intervention is permissible, but an "initial agency determination" 
made by "department staff without conducting adjudicative proceedings . . . . " Utah 
Admin. Code R432-30-2(2). As a result, there was no formal adjudicative proceeding in 
which to intervene. By not filing a Request for Agency Action under Utah Admin. Code 
R432-30-3(3), Petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and their 
Petition for Review should be Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction. For the same reason 
(among others), the Department appropriately denied Petitioners' Petition to Intervene. 
Furthermore, even if the Department erred in denying intervention, such error was 
harmless because the Department acted well-within its discretion in interpreting Utah 
Code Ann. § 26-21-23(5) to mean that the February 28, 2007 statutory deadline could be 
met by filing a "Notice of Intent." The Department's interpretation is rationally based, is 
consistent with the statute, and is not "arbitrary," "capricious," or "beyond the tolerable 
16 
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limits of reason." It would be grossly unfair to penalize Licensee for its justifiable 
reliance on the Department's validly enacted rule interpreting the statutory deadline. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW SHOULD BE DISMISSED 
BECAUSE PETITIONERS FAILED TO EXHAUST THEIR 
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. 
Petitioners assert that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over their Petition 
for Judicial Review based on Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a). (Pet. Br. at 1.) That 
section, however, only provides that: 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction 
of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public 
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust 
Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands 
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural 
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a) (emphasis added). Petitioners wrongly presuppose 
that the Final Agency Order they are asking this Court to review was the result of a 
formal adjudicative proceeding. 
Licensing proceedings before the Department are not formal adjudicative 
proceedings. Instead, under the Department's rules, the decision to grant or deny a 
license is made as an "initial agency determination," which is defined as "a decision by 
department staff, without conducting adjudicative proceedings, of the legal rights, duties, 
privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of one or more identifiable persons, 
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including all determinations to grant, deny, revoke, suspend, modify, annul, withdraw, or 
amend [ a l . . . license . . . . " Utah Admin. Code R432-30-2(2) (emphasis added). In 
other words, when Petitioners sought intervention, there was no formal adjudicative 
action in which to intervene. 
The Department's regulations do provide an avenue for interested persons to 
challenge initial agency determinations, stating that any "person affected by an initial 
agency determination may commence an adjudicative proceeding . . . by completing the 
'Facility Licensing Request for Agency Action' form and filing the form with the 
Department." Utah Admin. Code R432-30-3(3). Petitioners did not request agency 
action is this matter either during the licensing process or after Licensee had obtained its 
license. As a result, Petitioners have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and 
their Petition should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 63G-4-401(2) ("A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all 
administrative remedies available . . . ."); Bluth v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2002 UT 91, 
*H 23 (reversing and remanding with instructions that case be dismissed for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff had failed to exhaust administrative remedies). 
IL THE DEPARTMENT APPROPRIATELY DENIED PETITIONERS' 
PETITION TO INTERVENE IN THE LICENSING PROCEEDING. 
A. Under the Department's Regulations, There Was No Formal 
Adjudicative Proceeding in Which Petitioners Could Have Intervened. 
In proceedings before the Department, Petitioners repeatedly argued that they 
were entitled to intervene under Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-207 because the license 
application process constituted a "formal adjudicative proceeding" under Utah Admin. 
18 
#259341 vl sic 
Code R432-30-3(l). This argument misses the mark because the licensing process was 
not an "adjudicative proceeding." As already discussed, under the Department's 
regulations, initial licensing decisions are made by Department staff without conducting 
adjudicative proceedings of any sort. See Utah Admin. Code R432-30-2(2). The rules 
further provide that initial agency determinations (including any of the determinations 
made by department staff in the course of a licensing proceeding) may be challenged by 
persons such as Petitioners by filing their own Request for Agency Action. Utah Admin. 
Code R432-30-3(3). Petitioners did not file such a request during the licensing 
proceedings or after the Department had issued Licensee its License. 
Although the non-existence of a pending, formal adjudicative proceeding was not 
stated as the basis of the Department's order denying intervention, "it is well established 
that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any 
ground or theory apparent on the record . . . ." First Equity Fed., Inc. v. Phillips 
Development, L.C., 2002 UT 56, }^ 11 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
Because there was no pending formal adjudicative proceeding in which Petitioners could 
have intervened, the Department's order denying intervention should be affirmed. 
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B. The Department Acted Within Its Discretion in Determining that the 
Interests of Justice and Prompt Conduct of the Adjudicative 
Proceedings Would Be Materially Impaired by Allowing the 
Intervention. 
Even if the licensing process were a formal adjudicative proceeding (and Licensee 
contends it was not, as already discussed), intervention is only required if the presiding 
officer determines that: 
(a) the petitioner's legal interests may be substantially affected by the 
formal adjudicative proceeding; and 
(b) the interests of justice and the orderly and prompt conduct of the 
adjudicative proceedings will not be materially impaired by allowing the 
intervention. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-207(2)(a)-(b) (emphasis added). 
With respect to the second prong of this test, the Department's Order denying 
intervention states, in relevant part, that "at this late date, an administrative hearing that 
does not directly address the potential licensee, but an intervenor is unnecessary, contrary 
to the Bureau's precedent, and not in the best interest of the public or the Medicaid 
program." (R. 475.) Findings of fact such as these will be affirmed if they are 
"supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the 
court." Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Substantial evidence supports the Department's factual findings with respect to the 
second prong of the intervention inquiry. First, permitting intervention so late in the 
process would have undoubtedly impaired the orderly and prompt conduct of the 
licensing proceedings. Petitioners are not without fault in this regard. Petitioners' first 
moved to intervene on March 25, 2008, and their Motion to Intervene was denied by 
20 
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letter dated June 5, 2008. (R. 384-85.) Rather than immediately seeking judicial review, 
Petitioners voluntarily requested that the Department reconsider its decision on June 24, 
2008. (R. 401-10.) 
Petitioners' first request for a stay was filed with Department on December 15, 
2008, after the Department had issued its Final Agency Order concerning intervention. 
(R. 486-497.) In the meantime, Licensee had completed construction of the facility and 
the Department conducted its final inspection on December 17, 2008. (R. 503, <[fl| 10-13.) 
Licensee obtained its license the next day. (See Robison Aff., Ex. C; see also Addendum 
B to Petitioners' Brief.) Permitting intervention after the facility was constructed, staffed 
and ready to accept patients would clearly interfere with the licensing proceedings 
contrary to the interests of justice. 
Additionally, although Petitioners contend that Utah Admin. Code R432-2-6(8) 
invalidly interprets the application requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 26-21-23(5)(b), they 
never challenged that rule using the procedures established by the Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act (the "UARA"), Utah Code Ann. § 63G-3-101, et seq. The UARA 
establishes procedures for challenging the validity of an administrative rule, stating that 
%
'[A]n interested person may petition an agency to request the . . . amendment or repeal of 
a rule." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-3-601(2). After exhausting all administrative remedies 
under Section 63-46a-12, the "person aggrieved by a rule may obtain judicial review of 
the rule by filing a complaint " Utah Code Ann. § 63G-3-602(l)(a). Although Rule 
R432-2-6(8) was effective May 29, 2007, Petitioners never sought to invalidate Rule 
R432-2-6(8) under these procedures, and instead attempted to intervene in a licensing 
21 
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proceeding months after construction of Licensee's facility had begun. (R. 503, f 9; R. 
153-59.) 
Other evidence supporting the Department's decision to deny intervention is the 
fact found by the Department that an "administrative hearing that does not directly 
address the potential licensee, but an intervenor" (R. 475) was not consistent with the 
second prong of the intervention statute. In essence, Petitioners are attempting to have 
adjudicated the legality of a Department regulation that they could have challenged 
outside a licensing proceeding, and much earlier, in a challenge to the rule itself. 
Substantial evidence supports the Department's determination that the interests of 
justice and the orderly and prompt conduct of the adjudicative proceedings would have 
been materially impaired by allowing the intervention. Licensee respectfully requests 
that the Department's order denying intervention be affirmed. 
C. If the Department Erred by Not Permitting Intervention, Such Error 
Was Harmless. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4) provides that an appellate court can only grant 
relief on judicial review of final agency action if the petitioner has been 'substantially 
prejudiced." Accordingly, Petitioners must demonstrate that the purported error by the 
agency was not harmless. Stokes v. Bd. of Review, 832 P.2d 56 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
("The requirement of'substantial prejudice" in section (4) manifests the legislature's 
intent that relief not be given for an agency error if the error was harmless."). 
Even if the Department erred by denying intervention, such error was harmless 
because Petitioners' purely legal challenge to the Department's interpretive rule 
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regarding the effectiveness of a Notice of Intent filed prior to the statutory deadline lacks 
merit. As discussed in Section IV below, the Department's determination that the 
statutory deadline established by Utah Code Ann. § 26-21-23(5)(a) "shall be met if a 
nursing care facility filed a notice of intent or application with the Department and paid a 
fee relating to a proposed nursing care facility prior to March 1, 2007," Utah Admin. 
Code R43 2-2-6(8), was a rational interpretation of that statute and is not "arbitrary," 
"capricious" or "beyond the tolerable limits of reason." Petitioners have not 
demonstrated that the procedures afforded by intervention would have permitted them to 
discover or produce any evidence relevant to this question. Therefore, even if the 
Department improperly denied intervention, such error was harmless. 
III. THE DEPARTMENT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO ADDRESS 
PETITIONERS' STATUTORY ARGUMENTS IN THE CONTEXT 
OF ITS MOTION TO INTERVENE. 
In their Petition to Intervene, Petitioners asserted the argument that under Utah 
Code Ann. § 26-21-3(5)(a), an "application," rather than a Notice of Intent, should have 
been filed prior to the March 1, 2007 deadline in order to avoid the Legislative 
moratorium on new licenses for skilled nursing facilities. Petitioners have cited no 
authority suggesting that an agency like the Department is required to address substantive 
arguments raised by a proposed intervenor when a motion to intervene is denied. In their 
Motion to Intervene, Petitioners only requested "that the Department enter an Order 
granting Invervenors' petition to intervene in this docket allowing Intervenors to 
participate to the full extent allowed by law." (R. 158.) 
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In other words, Petitioners did not even request that the Department consider their 
statutory arguments before ruling on their Motion to Intervene. As a result, the 
Department did not fail to address any issue requiring resolution under Utah Code Ann. 
63G-4-403(4)(c). 
IV. THE DEPARTMENT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING 
LICENSEE ITS LICENSE. 
A. Under the Department's Regulation R432-2-6(8), the Notice of Intent 
Filed on February 28, 2007 Was Effective. 
During the 2007 Legislative session, the Legislature established a moratorium on 
licenses for Medicare-only skilled nursing facilities, and established a February 28, 2007 
deadline for new Medicare-only facilities. See Utah Code Ann. § 26-21-23(2) and (5). 
Almost immediately thereafter, the Department enacted a rule interpreting this provision. 
Effective May 29, 2007, Utah Administrative Code section R432-2-6 was amended to 
state that "[t]he requirements contained in Utah Code Section 26-21-23(5)(a) shall be met 
if a nursing care facility filed a notice of intent or application with the Department and 
paid a fee relating to a proposed nursing care facility prior to March 1, 2007." Utah 
Admin. Code R432-2-6(8). 
Without knowing that February 28, 2007 was the last date to do so, Mr. Burraston 
filed the Notice of Intent for the Pointe Meadows project that day. Under Rule R432-2-
6(8), the Notice of Intent was timely and the Legislative moratorium did not apply to the 
Pointe Meadows project. 
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B. The Department's Interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 26-21-23(5), as 
Reflected in Rule R432-2-6(8), Is Not Arbitrary, Capricious or Beyond 
the Tolerable Limits of Reason. 
1. The Legislature Has Granted the Department Discretion with 
Respect to Enforcement of Its Governing Statutes. 
The Utah Legislature has granted the Department wide discretion to interpret its 
enabling statute, and in same code section that established the moratorium, provided that 
the Department may make rules to administer and enforce that section. 
With respect to the statutes governing the Department of Health (Title 26 of the 
Utah Code), the Legislature has empowered the Department to "establish, maintain, and 
enforce rules necessary or desirable to carry out the provisions and purposes of this title 
to promote and protect the public health or to prevent disease and illness . . . . " Utah 
Code Ann. § 26-l-30(2)(b). Furthermore, in the very section that sets forth the 
moratorium deadline, the Legislature established that "[t]he department may make rules 
to administer and enforce this part in accordance with Title 63 G, Chapter 3, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act." Utah Code Ann. § 26-21-23(4). As a result, the 
Department is afforded significant discretion in interpreting the Utah Health Code, and 
Utah Code Ann.§ 26-21-23 in particular, which established the moratorium deadline. 
Thus, with respect to the Department's "interpretation of the operative provisions 
of the statutory law it is empowered to administer, [its] findings must be rationally based 
and are set aside only if they are imposed arbitrarily and capriciously or are beyond the 
tolerable limits of reason." Associated General Contractors, 2001 UT 112, % 18 
(emphasis added); see also Concerned Parents v. Mitchell, 645 P.2d 629, 633 (Utah 
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1982) ("Judicial deference is usually accorded an agency's interpretation of a statute 
which that agency is charged with enforcing."). 
2. The Department's Interpretation of the Legislature's 
Application Requirement Is Rationally Based and Not 
Arbitrary, Capricious, or Beyond the Tolerable Limits of 
Reason. 
The Department's interpretive rule that a notice of intent filed prior to March 1, 
2007, satisfies the requirements of Section 26-21-23(5)(a) is not "irrational," "arbitrary,' 
"capricious" or "beyond the tolerable limits of reason." To begin with, the statute does 
not define the term "application," and does not suggest that any particular Department 
form must have been completed and filed to satisfy the "application" requirement. In 
fact, in Utah Code Ann. § 26-21-9(1), the Legislature has granted the Department 
complete discretion to determine what constitutes an application, stating that "[a]n 
application for license shall be made to the department in a form prescribed by the 
department. The application and other documentation requested by the department as part 
of the application process shall require such information as the committee determines 
necessary to ensure compliance with established rules." Utah Code Ann. § 26-21-9(1) 
(emphasis added). 
Moreover, the Department's determination that a "Notice of Intent" fulfilled the 
Legislature's undefined application requirement (as stated in Utah Admin. Code R432-2-
6) is consistent with the Department's rule that an application for a license is not 
complete until the Licensee has submitted all of the documents necessary to become 
licensed. Utah Admin. Code R432-2-6(2) provides as follows: 
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Each applicant shall comply with all zoning, fire, safety, sanitation, 
building and licensing laws, regulations, ordinances, and codes of the city 
and county in which the facility or agency is located. The applicant shall 
obtain the following clearances and submit them as part of the completed 
application to the licensing agency: 
(a) A certificate of fire clearance from the State Fire Marshal or designated 
local fire authority certifying compliance with local and state fire codes is 
required with initial and renewal application, change of ownership, and at 
any time new construction or substantial remodeling has occurred. 
(b) A satisfactory Food Services Sanitation Clearance report by a local or 
state sanitarian is required for facilities providing food service at initial 
application and upon a change of ownership. 
(c) Certificate of Occupancy from the local building official at initial 
application, change of location and at the time of any new construction or 
substantial remodeling. 
Utah Admin. Code R432-2-6(2)(a)-(c) (emphasis added). In other words, the Department 
does not consider an application to be fully submitted until all of these clearances are 
obtained. 
This process is also confirmed in the Department's Information Sheet regarding 
Facility/Agency Licensing Requirements, which lists several steps that should be taken 
after filing a Notice of Intent but before submitting a License Application, including 
paying an application fee, preparing a written program description, submitting a policy 
and procedure manual, etc. (R. 338.) 
Indeed, the Legislature itself implicitly acknowledged that a complete application 
was not required by the February 28, 2007 deadline by establishing a much later deadline 
- July 1, 2008 - for the submission of working construction drawings for a new facility. 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-21-23(5)(b). Under Utah Admin. Code R432-2-6(2), an application 
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to the Department is not complete until several clearances are obtained that are not 
available until construction is well underway or completed, such as the Certificate of 
Occupancy. If an applicant needed to obtain and submit those clearances by the February 
28, 2007 deadline, the Legislature's July 1, 2008 deadline for the submission of working 
drawings to the Department makes no sense. The July 1, 2008 deadline for the 
submission of construction plans evidences the Legislature's intent that February 28, 
2007 was the deadline to initiate licensing proceedings with the Department, and not a 
deadline for the submission of what Rule 432-2-6(2) establishes as a completed 
application. 
Finally, Petitioners' argument that the Legislature's use of the term "application" 
means the Department's form captioned "Request for Agency Action/License 
Application" under Utah Admin. Code R432-2-6(l) is erroneous. That section states that 
"[a]n applicant for a license shall file a Request for Agency Action/License Application 
on a form furnished by the Department." This rule does not say that an application 
consists only of the Request for Agency Action/License Application form, and such a 
reading would contradict Rule 432-2-6(2)'s requirements for a completed application. 
This rule merely specifies that an applicant must use the Department's form, nothing 
more. 
The Department's interpretation that filing a Notice of Intent prior to the February 
28, 2007 deadline satisfied the statutory application requirement is based on the 
Department's statutory duty to determine what constitutes an application (see Utah Code 
Ann. § 26-21-9(1)), its previously enacted rules governing what must be included with a 
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complete application {see Utah Admjn. Code R432-2-6(2)), and evidence that the 
Legislature understood that a fully completed application, including construction 
drawings, was not required by the February 28, 2007 deadline. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 26-21-23(5)(b) (establishing July 1, 2008, as the deadline for submitting working 
drawings to the Department). The Department's interpretation of the statutory 
application requirement, as reflected in Utah Admin. Code R432-2-6(8), is rational and 
not "arbitrary," "capricious" or "beyond the tolerable limits of reason." Associated 
General Contractors, 2001 UT 112, % 18. The Court should defer to the discretion 
afforded the Department and not overrule the Department's decision to grant Licensee a 
license. 
C. The Department's Rule Interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 26-21-23(5)(A) 
Did Not Retroactively Change Or Alter The Statute. 
Contrary to Petitioners' arguments, the Department's rule interpreting Utah Code 
Ann. § 26-21-23(5)(a), which established the statutory deadline, did not retroactively 
change or alter the meaning of that section. Instead, as already discussed, the 
Department's rule (Utah Admin. Code R432-2-6(8)) merely interpreted the statutory 
language in a manner that is not irrational, arbitrary, capricious or beyond the tolerable 
limits of reason. Associated General Contractors, 2001 UT 112, ^ f 18. Thus, Bowen v. 
Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 208, 109 S. Ct. 468 (1988), which 
prohibits agencies from attempting to retroactively change or alter statutory requirements, 
is inapplicable. 
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Petitioners' argument that Rule R432-2-6(8) should not be applied retroactively 
because of the general rule that statutes are not retroactive "unless expressly so declared," 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3, is puzzling. The clear purpose of the Department's 
interpretative rule is to clarify the status of projects that had filed Notices of Intent prior 
to the Legislative deadline. Petitioners' assertion that the rule should not apply 
retroactively is not plausible because it would render the Rule meaningless. 
Interpreting the Rule in a way that renders it meaningless would be contrary to the 
general rules of statutory interpretation, which require the interpretation of "enactments 
in a way that render[s] all parts thereof relevant and meaningful" and "avoid[s] an 
interpretation which renders portions of, or words in, a statute superfluous or inoperative" 
or makes an enactment "unreasonably confused or inoperable." Andreason v. Felsted, 
2006 UT App 188, f 11 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Petitioners' 
interpretation of the rule - that it does not apply to filings before its effective date -
would render the Rule meaningless, superfluous and inoperable. Under the rules of 
interpretation, the rule applies to all Notices of Intent filed before the deadline, including 
the Pointe Meadows Notice of Intent. 
Furthermore, in reviewing an agency's interpretation of its own rules, courts 
"defer[] to an agency's interpretation as long as it is both reasonable and rational." 
Westside Dixon Assocs. v. Utah Power & Light Co., 2002 UT 31,^7. The Department's 
interpretation and application of Rule R43 2-2-6(8) to all Notices of Intent filed before the 
deadline, including the Pointe Meadows Notice of Intent, is the only reasonable and 
rational interpretation of that rule. 
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D. The Department's Decision To Permit The Proposed Facility's Change 
In Location Was Reasonable And Well-Within The Department's 
Discretion. 
There is no statute or regulation preventing the Department from permitting a 
party that timely filed a Notice of Intent and License Application to apply the Notice of 
Intent and Application to a different location, and Petitioners cite no legal authority 
suggesting that the Department should have required Licensee to file a new Notice of 
Intent after the Utah Department of Transportation forced it to abandon its selected site in 
Lehi for a site within the same county. 
Even if there were relevant regulations, in reviewing an agency's interpretation of 
its own rules, courts "defer[] to an agency's interpretation as long as it is both reasonable 
and rational." Westside Dixon Assocs., 2002 UT 31, If 7. The Department's 
determination in this case that the Notice of Intent and License Application are broad 
enough to constitute a Notice of Intent and License Application to build a facility within 
11 miles of the original location, rather than in Lehi specifically, is "both reasonable and 
rational." Id. at 778. 
This is particularly true given the unusual circumstances in this case, in which 
another state agency, UDOT, demanded the sale of the Lehi property after considerable 
resources had been spent developing it. The decision to permit Licensee to seek a license 
for the same size facility in the same service area and geographic location was approved 
by an Assistant Attorney General for the State of Utah and is both reasonable and 
rational. 
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JOINDER IN ARGUMENTS BY STATE RESPONDENT 
Licensee hereby joins in the arguments made in Sections I and II of State 
Respondent's brief that Petitioners are not "persons" or legal entities eligible to be 
"aggrieved parties" entitled to petition for judicial review under Utah Code Ann. § 63G-
4-403(4), to intervene in agency proceedings under Utah Code Ann. § 630-4-207(1), or 
to bring an original action in a Utah Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Licensee respectfully requests that the Court dismiss the 
Petition for Review based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on Petitioners' 
failure to exhaust their administrative remedies by filing a Request for Agency Action 
under Utah Admin. Code R432-30-3(3). Licensee further requests that the Court dismiss 
the Petition for Review based on State Respondents' arguments that Petitioners are not 
"persons" or legal entities eligible to be "aggrieved parties" entitled to petition for 
judicial review under Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4), to intervene in agency 
proceedings under Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-207(l), or to bring an original action in a 
Utah Court. 
In the alternative, Licensee requests that the Court affirm the Department's order 
denying Petitioners leave to intervene in the licensing proceeding as well as the 
Department's issuance of a license to Licensee. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th day 
)LME ROBERT 
Blaine J. Benard 
J. Andrew Sjoblom 
Attorneys for Real Party in Interest 
Stonehenge of Orem, LLC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this 13th day of August, 2009, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing BRffiF OF RESPONDENT AND REAL PARTY IN 
INTEREST STONEHENGE OF OREM, LLC was served via U.S. mail, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Stephen F. Mecham (4089) 
Mark L. Callister (6709) 
Callister Nebeker & McCullough 
10 East South Temple Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
Annina Mitchell (2274) 
Utah Solicitor General 
Mark L. Shurtleff 
Utah Attorney General 
P.O. Box 140858 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0858 
Attorneys for State Agency Respondent 
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